\u3ci\u3eAshcroft v. Iqbal\u3c/i\u3e Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to Unconstitutional Shores by Klein, Kenneth S.
Nebraska Law Review 
Volume 88 Issue 2 Article 1 
2009 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to 
Unconstitutional Shores 
Kenneth S. Klein 
California Western School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 
Neb. L. Rev. (2009) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol88/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Kenneth S. Klein*
Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8
Pleading Standards on to
Unconstitutional Shores
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................... 262
II. The Evolution of Contemporary (Heightened) Pleading
Standards ............................................ 265
A. The Eighteenth Century English System of Form
Pleading .......................................... 265
B. The American Evolution from Form Pleading to
Fact Pleading to Notice Pleading .................. 267
C. Notice Pleading and the Seventh Amendment ...... 268
D. From "No Set of Facts" to "Plausible Facts"......... 269
III. Under Iqbal, Rule 8 is Unconstitutional (Sometimes) .. 274
A. The Historical Test Leaves No Wiggle Room for
Iqbal .............................................. 274
B. The Supreme Court's Application of the Historical
Test to Pre-Trial Civil Procedure .................. 276
C. The Academic Debate over the Constitutionality of
Pre-Trial Civil Procedure .......................... 283
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Assistant Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. I am incapable of
writing an Article without the assistance and support of many others. I particu-
larly thank my personal editor, spouse, and best friend, Professor Lisa Black. I
greatly appreciate the research support of the Library staff at California Western
School of Law, and the exceptionally valuable comments and input of my profes-
sional colleagues, Professors Mark Weinstein, Larry Benner, and Robert Bohrer
of California Western School of Law, and Professor Walter Heiser of the Univer-
sity of San Diego School of Law. Catherine Pugh put in the tough duty of the
initial Bluebook cite checking of this Article for me, for which I am very grateful.
A special thanks is due to Jared Hestetune, my research assistant on a different
article, who nonetheless in support of this Article found Dahlia Lithwick's color-
ful comments regarding Twombly, Civil Procedure professors, and live ferrets.
The staff of the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW deserves credit for their professionalism
and quality work-they made this Article better. Finally, I dedicate this Article
to the memory of my mother-in-law, Marian Black, who passed in her sleep dur-
ing the writing of this Article. Ms. Black expected, inspired, and required me to
think more clearly every day.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
D. The Constitutionality of the Motion To Dismiss-A
Thought Experiment .............................. 284
IV . Conclusion ............................................ 287
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early nineteenth century, the interpretation of the Sev-
enth Amendment preservation of the right to a civil trial by jury has
remained static and become increasingly anachronistic. Over the
same period of time, the evolution of modern civil procedure pleading
standards has been on a collision course with that interpretation. The
penultimate 2007 Supreme Court opinion in this field, Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly,1 raised the specter of an impending impasse be-
tween pleading standards and the Seventh Amendment. The 2009
opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 is the point of impact. While the Iqbal
opinion fails to even acknowledge a potential conflict with the Seventh
Amendment, the decision inescapably interprets Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 in a manner that is unconstitutional when measured
against the traditional (and continuing) interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment-the so-called "historical test."
The collision between Iqbal and the Seventh Amendment, simply
stated, is that under the historical test it is unconstitutional to give a
judge the power to weigh the factual heft of a complaint at the outset
of a civil case and to dismiss it as insufficient. Yet, that power is pre-
cisely what the Iqbal Court held was a permissible mechanism for con-
trolling frivolous litigation.
The Seventh Amendment provides that "in suits at common law
... the right to trial by jury shall be preserved." 3 In the early nine-
teenth century, the courts held that the Seventh Amendment preser-
vation of a right to trial by jury in civil cases was measured by a static,
or fixed in time, reference to common law in England in 1791.4 In
other words, a federal claim or procedure in a civil case falls within
the scope of the Seventh Amendment if it existed, or had an analog, in
the common law courts of 1791 England. This became known as the
"historical test."5 It remains today the operative interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment. 6
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4. Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to
a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1020-30 (1992) [hereinafter Klein I].
5. Id. at 1023.
6. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte, 526 U.S. 687, 708-09 (1999); Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures, 523 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1998); Chauffers v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 566-68, 584 (1990).
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As pleading standards have evolved in American courts, the stan-
dards have crept closer and closer to the edges of what would not sat-
isfy the historical test. The common law in England in 1791 did not
have pre-trial attacks on the pleadings for insufficient or implausible
facts.7 Eighteenth century civil pleadings were form writs. Pleading
challenges tested compliance with the form. But as the American
courts moved from form pleading to the Field Codes to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8, complaints moved from forms, to narratives, to no-
tice pleading, and so motions to dismiss moved from attacks on com-
pliance with a form to attacks on the factual sufficiency of a story, to
attacks on the sufficiency of notice to a defendant about what a suit
concerns. This inevitably challenged the dividing line between the re-
spective roles of judge and jury.
The Supreme Court presaged the crossing of that line in
Twombly.8 Twombly involved a consumer class action challenge to lo-
cal telecommunications companies on the basis that the parallel pric-
ing of internet services could be explained only by as yet undiscovered
conduct by the telecommunications companies in violation of antitrust
laws.9 The Court found that given the expense of discovery in anti-
trust cases, among other reasons, a trial court could dismiss this com-
plaint on the basis that its facts were not "plausible."1O
Twombly left open many questions. One prominent question was
noted by the circuit court in Iqbal itself-whether the Twombly opin-
ion really intended to change pleading standards at all."1 Even as-
suming Twombly did create a new, plausibility pleading standard, the
question remained whether Twombly applied to all civil litigation, or
whether Twombly was narrow in application (perhaps either to anti-
trust contexts or to high-expense litigation contexts).
The Court answered both questions in Iqbal, a Bivens action
brought by a post-9/11 detainee against numerous federal officials, in-
cluding both the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Attorney General of the United States.12 In Iqbal, the Court held
that a trial court, if ruling on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, should not
simply accept all of the factual allegations of a complaint as true, but
rather should "draw on its judicial experience and common sense" to
7. William E. Nelson, Summary Judgment and the Progressive Constitution, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1653, 1657 (2008).
8. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9. Id. at 550-55.
10. Id. at 555-63.
11. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nor.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (June 16, 2008) (No. 07-1015) ("Considerable
uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings has
recently been created by the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly.").
12. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943-45 (2009).
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determine "whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief."13
The Court rejected the notion of restricting its interpretation of Rule 8
to the narrow context of Twombly, rather holding that "[olur decision
in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions." ' 1
The opinion in Twombly suggested the Court was amenable to us-
ing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a screening device to iden-
tify and quickly dispose of perceived frivolous litigation, and so
triggered a vigorous, and important, debate about the desirability of
imposing a system-wide, heightened Rule 8 fact pleading requirement
for civil cases in federal court.15 Iqbal confirmed the Court's inten-
tions as foreshadowed in Twombly and certainly will only increase the
vigor of the colloquy. Almost entirely missing from that largely aca-
demic debate, however, is any recognition that given the current state
of Seventh Amendment law, it should be purely an academic debate.16
Nowhere in Twombly or Iqbal is there any recognition that in the com-
mon law courts of 1791 England, a trial court could not dismiss a
pleading because the factual allegations were implausible.17
Part I of this Article traces the development of the pleading stan-
dards from writs to Rule 8 to Iqbal. Part II demonstrates that under
13. Id. at 1950.
14. Id. at 1953.
15. A small sampling of the academic discussion of Twombly is: DAVID CRUMPET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 301-08 (5th ed., LexisNexis 2008);
RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES, MATERI-
ALS, AND QUESTIONS 298-310 (5th ed., LexisNexis 2008); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 526-37 (2008 rev. ed., Thomson
West); RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1205-24 (Updated 4th ed., Thomson West
2008); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 359-64 (7th ed., Aspen 2008);
Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117 (2007), http://www.law.northwest-
ern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/31/LRCol12007n3lBradley.pdf; Charles B.
Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L. J. 1
(2008); M. Norman Goldberger, Colleen F. Coonelly & Justine M. Kasznica,
Courts Begin To Apply Twombly, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 2007, at S-1; Allan Ides, Bell
Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice,
243 F.R.D. 604 (2007); Lee Reeves, Pragmatism Over Politics: Recent Trends in
Lower Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 Mo. L. REV. 481,
548-51 (2008); Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431
(2008); Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A "Plausible" Explanation of Pleading Stan-
dards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 827 (2007); Note, Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305 (2007).
16. So far, only one scholar or commentator has written about the possible conflict
between Twombly and the Constitution. Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dis-
miss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV 1851 (2008) [hereinafter Thomas
I]. As of the time of this writing, none have written about Iqbal.
17. Nelson, supra note 7, at 1657.
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the historical test, Iqbal's interpretation of Rule 8 is unconstitu-
tional-at least in cases to which the Seventh Amendment applies.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CONTEMPORARY (HEIGHTENED)
PLEADING STANDARDS
Under current Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, the constitu-
tionality of any particular procedural practice requires more than a
comparison of the practice to constitutional text; it requires an inquiry
as to whether the procedure existed or had an analog in eighteenth
century English common law practice. And, of course, because of the
potential impact of precedent, one should also consider any constitu-
tional evaluations that were made regarding the interim, evolutionary
iterations of the procedure. Thus, to evaluate the constitutionality of
a current procedural approach, one needs to know not just where we
are, but where we began and how we traveled from one point to the
other.
A. The Eighteenth Century English System of Form
Pleading
The common law in England in 1791 was not structured in a way
that anticipated a pre-trial attack on the pleadings for insufficient or
implausible facts.' 8 The role of pleadings was to frame a case within a
particular form of code pleading, or writ, and to notify the defendant of
what form had been asserted. It was not to notify the defendant of the
specific facts giving rise to a dispute. 19 Stated in only slightly over-
generalized terms, English common law pleading in 1791 entailed as-
serting through a declaration an entitlement by a recognized writ suf-
ficient to notify the defendant of which form of action was claimed. 20
English common law in 1791 provided few mechanisms for a judge,
rather than the jury, to decide a case. There was no "procedure (other
than demurrer [to the pleadings]) that would allow a judge to deter-
mine before trial that a case presented no issue to be decided by a jury,
or that an issue in a case should be withheld from the jury."21 A de-
murrer to the pleadings allowed a trial court to enter judgment as a
matter of law if the parties conceded that they had no factual dispute
18. Id.
19. See BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HAND-BOOK OF COMMON-LAw PLEADING 423-26 (2d ed.,
West 1895).
20. See id. at 417-18.
21. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139, 149 (2007) (quoting James Oldham, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial: Late-Eighteenth-Century Practice Reconsidered, in Human Rights and Le-
gal History: Essays in Honour of Brian Simpson 225, 231 (Katherine O'Donovan
& Gerry R. Rubin eds., 2000)) [hereinafter Thomas II].
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with each other.2 2 Even at the trial stage, under English common
law, a judge could never decide a case without a jury or the parties
determining the facts, however improbable the evidence might be.2 3
If the judge considered a factual matter to be of such common sense
that it was not necessary to summon a jury to decide it, the court had
a pre-trial procedure available called "trial by inspection."24 Contem-
porary scholars disagree over whether the proper modern analogy to
trial by inspection is the contemporary device of judicial notice, or the
procedure of summary judgment.25 Under either construct, it de-
pended upon a fact being either undisputed or undisputable. 2 6
If the plaintiff failed to appear at trial, the judge could order a non-
suit.27 This resulted in the equivalent of a dismissal without
prejudice. 28
After the close of evidence, but before verdict, an English common
law judge in 1791 could take a matter away from the jury through a
demurrer to the evidence. 29 This was a mechanism available at the
end of trial which admitted all facts shown by the plaintiff as well as
all inferences and asked for a ruling by the court on the "law of the
case."3o The federal court procedure of directed verdict "superseded
the ancient practice of a demurrer to evidence."31
22. Id. at 148-49 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *314-15). See also
HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, HAND-BOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING BY BENJA-
MIN J. SHIPMAN 277-79 (Third ed., West 1923).
23. Thomas II, supra note 21, at 143, 147-58.
24. Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625,
1631-32 (2008) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *331-32).
25. Id. at 1636-41; Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Still Unconstitu-
tional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1667, 1676-77
(2008) [hereinafter Thomas III].
26. Brunet, supra note 24, at 1631-40.
27. Thomas II, supra note 21, at 154 (citing 2 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE
COURT OF KING'S BENCH, IN PERSONAL ACTIONS 586-87 (London, A. Strahan & W.
Woodfall 1794)).
28. Id. at 154 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *376-77).
29. Id. at 150-51 (citing FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw RELATIVE TO
TRIALS AT NISI PRIus 307 (London, W. Starhan & M. Woodfall 1772)). This prac-
tice fell into disuse in England in 1793 and in the United States federal courts in
1826. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 399-400 (1943) (Black, J. dissent-
ing) (citing Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H.Bl. 187, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep 499, 510, and
Fowle v. Alexandria, 24 U.S. 320 (1826)).
30. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 399-400 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Wright v. Pindar
(1647) Alleyn 18 and Pawling v. United States, 8 U.S. 219 (1808)). See also Parks
v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362, 373 (1850) ("A demurrer to evidence admit[ed] (sic) not only
the facts stated therein, but also every conclusion which a jury might fairly or
reasonably infer therefrom."); Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H.Bl. 187, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep
499, 510.
31. Parks, 52 U.S. at 373.
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After verdict, a 1791 English common law judge could order the re-
examination of the facts by granting a motion for new trial.32 English
common law in 1791 also had the procedure of "special case," or "case
stated," through which a judge decided purely legal issues after trial,
but it is of limited pertinence to this Article because when it involved a
jury the procedure in no way allowed the judge to question, supplant,
or revisit the jury's factual determinations. 33 The judge further could
order a compulsory non-suit. 3 4 This was the equivalent to finding as a
matter of law that a party had failed to meet the burden of producing
evidence on an element. 3 5
In summary, in English common law in 1791, pleadings were form
driven, not fact driven. The weighing of facts was not a matter of con-
cern at the pleading stage and ultimately, regardless of the procedural
juncture, the jury had the sole right to weigh the evidence.
B. The American Evolution from Form Pleading to Fact
Pleading to Notice Pleading
Because eighteenth century English common law practice was one
of form pleading, some focus should be placed on how American courts
moved from form pleading to fact pleading while staying within the
contours of the Seventh Amendment. Justice Stevens' dissent in
Twombly provides a concise summary of the history of the develop-
ment of contemporary American federal court pleading standards for
civil cases in the period from the break with England to the decision in
Twombly:
The English experience with Byzantine special pleading rules-illustrated
by the hypertechnical Hilary rules of 1834-made obvious the appeal of a
pleading standard that was easy for the common litigant to understand and
sufficed to put the defendant on notice as to the nature of the claim against
him and the relief sought. Stateside, David Dudley Field developed the highly
influential New York Code of 1848, which required "[a] statement of the facts
constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without
repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understand-
ing to know what is intended."....
A difficulty arose, however, in that the Field Code and its progeny required
a plaintiff to plead "facts" rather than "conclusions," a distinction that proved
far easier to say than to apply .... Rule 8 was directly responsive to this
difficulty. Its drafters intentionally avoided any reference to "facts" or "evi-
dence" or "conclusions." ....
Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules, the idea was
not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in. The merits of a
claim would be sorted out during a flexible pretrial process and, as appropri-
32. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 448 (1830).
33. Thomas II, supra note 21, at 156-57.
34. Id. at 155 (citing Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 80 HARv. L. REV. 289, 301 (1966)).
35. Id. (citing Co. of Carpenters v. Hayward, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 241 and Pleasant v.
Benson, (1811) 104 Eng. Rep. 590, 591).
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ate, through the crucible of trial. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122 S.Ct.
992 ("The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simpli-
fied pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a
claim"). 3 6
As this summary highlights, the only significant change in plead-
ing standards in the United States before Twombly was the move from
form pleading to fact pleading to notice pleading. Fact pleading first
arose as part of the Field Codes and, as a result of the difficulties in
defining the sufficiency of facts, eventually evolved into notice plead-
ing, which became codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
and (d)(1).37
For the fifty years immediately preceding Twombly, the pleading
standard necessary to satisfy Rule 8 came from Conley v. Gibson,3S
holding that a claim should give a "short and plain statement" of the
facts and claims sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of what a
lawsuit concerned, with the details left to be developed during discov-
ery.3 9 As the majority in Twombly discussed, over time this holding
was understood to mean that a complaint was sufficient unless there
was "no set of facts" under which the complaint could succeed. 40
C. Notice Pleading and the Seventh Amendment
While the move from form pleading to notice pleading by definition
meant that a motion to dismiss moved from an attack on the form to
an attack on the sufficiency of notice afforded by a bare-bones com-
plaint, United States courts apparently did not consider that the Field
Codes, Rule 8, or Conley might be inroads on the province of the jury
as it existed in 1791 English common law. During the entirety of the
two-hundred year evolution from common law code pleading, to the
Field Codes, to Rule 8, to Conley, to Twombly, there simply is no intro-
spection or lengthy discussion in the case law, or in scholarship, about
the intersection of the Seventh Amendment and pleading standards.
There is guidance, however, as to what the courts might have con-
cluded had the courts considered the matter, by looking at the parallel
procedural evolution of the "modicum of facts" necessary for a civil
case to reach a jury. In that context, courts did recognize and resolve
any issues with the Seventh Amendment. Thus, as the courts evolved
36. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573-75 (2007) (citations omitted)
(citing 9 W. HOLSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 324-327 (1926) (regarding the
Hilary rules of 1834)).
37. "A pleading.., must contain.., a short and plain statement of the claim ....
Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),
(d)(1).
38. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
39. Id. at 47.
40. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.
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from the jargon of a "scintilla" of evidence to some "proper" evidence, 4 1
the courts justified the change by noting its equivalency to the English
common law procedure of a demurrer to the evidence, which permitted
a judge to find that the evidence was insufficient to reach the jury.4 2
This suggests the "no set of facts" standard similarly would have fared
well under scrutiny, as it too looked much like the 1791 English com-
mon law demurrer to the evidence. In turn, this might explain why
early American courts, even as they moved to fact pleading (and later
to notice pleading), never perceived that they were wavering from the
1791 English common law view that weighing evidence was the exclu-
sive province of the jury, and thus did not perceive a Seventh Amend-
ment issue. 43
D. From "No Set of Facts" to "Plausible Facts"
The confidence that notice pleading did not present Seventh
Amendment issues should have been shaken by Twombly, for it fore-
shadowed a potential sea change in the general pleading standard.
One says "potentially" because there was never one-hundred percent
coherency in pleading standards before Twombly, and there certainly
was not one-hundred percent coherency after Twombly.4 4
The case arose out of the breakup of the national monopoly of
American Telephone & Telegraph Company into a number of regional
entities, so-called Baby Bells, and the subsequent breakup of those
regional monopolies.45 William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus, as
putative representatives of the class of subscribers of high-speed in-
ternet services, brought an action against several of the Baby Bells for
Sherman Act violations.4 6 In particular, the plaintiffs alleged the
Baby Bells inflated charges for local telephone and high-speed in-
ternet services by "engag[ing] in parallel conduct" in their respective
service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart competitors, and made
agreements "to refrain from competing against one another."47 As the
Court recounted,
The complaint couches its ultimate allegations this way:
"In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [Baby Bells] in
one another's markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that
each engaged in to prevent competition from [competitors] within their re-
spective local telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and the
other facts and market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon
information and belief that [the Baby Bells] have entered into a contract,
41. Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871).
42. Id. at 448 n.8.
43. Greenleafv. Birth, 34 U.S. 292, 299 (1835).
44. Ides, supra note 15.
45. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549.
46. Id. at 550.
47. Id. at 550-51.
20091
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combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective
local telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and have
agreed not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated customers
and markets to one another."
4 8
In other words, the plaintiffs saw and alleged parallel pricing and on
that basis suspected and alleged an illegal pricing agreement. While
the Court in Twombly purported still to be applying the Conley stan-
dard,49 in reviewing the adequacy of these allegations the Court af-
firmed a dismissal of the complaint on a Rule 12 motion for failure to
plead a "plausible" set of facts. 50
The Twombly Court was not entirely clear what it meant by the
term "plausible." The Court appeared to say that it was clarifying and
applying, not abandoning, Conley.51 Yet the Court justified dismissal
of the complaint, in large part, because the cost of discovery in anti-
trust litigation was too much to impose if the plaintiffs did not already
have in hand, at the time of the filing of the complaint, at least some
facts of conspiracy beyond parallel conduct. 52 In essence, the Court
suggested that it suspected Twombly's counsel of being a predatory
plaintiffs' attorney suing purely based on suggestive but legal parallel
conduct, and with a hope that either discovery would uncover more or
that the sheer cost of discovery would extort a lucrative settlement.
Simply put, the Court smelled a rat. Given this context-as well as
the Court's self-touted continued adherence to Conley-it was hard to
know from the opinion which of many more familiar legal standards
the Court meant by "plausible." The choices included: "possible" (the
Conley standard), "probable" (a burden of proof standard), "believable"
(a weight of the evidence standard), or "sufficient" (a Rule 8(a) stan-
dard). It also was hard to know how broadly or narrowly Twombly
applied.
For this reason, among others, the precise meaning of Twombly
was ambiguous. The jargon of "plausibility" was new to the arena of
pleading standards and it was not certain that the Court really was
presaging a retreat from notice pleading back to fact pleading. These
factors, combined with reliance on the particular context of antitrust
litigation, made the consequence of Twombly a debatable matter. The
ambiguity was compounded just two weeks after the Court published
its opinion in Twombly, when the Court published its opinion in Erick-
son v. Pardus, which seemed to reaffirm the Conley notice pleading
standard. 53
48. Id. at 551.
49. Id. at 561-62.
50. Id. at 564-70.
51. Id. at 560-63.
52. Id. at 555-61.
53. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
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Yet Twombly did not go unnoticed. As legal journalist Dahlia
Lithwick reported at the time, "to America's civil-procedure profes-
sors, the effect of Twombly was akin to releasing a live ferret amid the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 54
Then, the Court decided Iqbal. Javiad Iqbal is a citizen of Pakistan
and a Muslim.55 Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, he was
arrested in the United States on immigration charges and was
deemed to be of "high interest" to the investigation of "the attacks in
particular or to terrorism in general."5 6 Iqbal pleaded guilty to the
immigration charges, served a term of imprisonment, and was re-
moved to Pakistan.5 7 He then brought a Bivens action concerning his
treatment in confinement pending his trial.58 Iqbal sued, among
others, John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the United
States, and Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation.59 Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss the com-
plaint.60 The district court denied their motion (pre-Twombly), citing
the "no set of facts" standard of Conley.6 1 The court of appeals (post-
Twombly) found that while Twombly retired the "no set of facts" stan-
dard, Iqbal's complaint was not one that necessitated further factual
amplification. 6 2 The Supreme Court reversed. 63
The Court held that under Twombly, Rule 8 "demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation," "'la-
bels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action"' 64 A complaint must have "facial plausibility," mean-
ing "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable infer-
ence that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."65 The
54. Dahlia Lithwick, Supreme Court Dispatches: The Attorney General Is a Very Busy
Man, The Supreme Court Seems to Think That also Makes Him Immune from
Litigation, SLATE, http://www.slate.com/id/2206441/.
55. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
56. Id. at 1943.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1942.
60. Id. at 1944.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1945.
64. Id. at 1949. The Court did not address the view, expressed by Professor Wright
(and cited by the dissent in Twombly), that in Rule 8 the "substitution of 'claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief for the code formulation of the 'facts'
constituting a 'cause of action' was intended to avoid the distinctions drawn
under the codes among 'evidentiary facts,' 'ultimate facts,' and 'conclusions'." 5 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216, at 207 (3d ed.
2004).
65. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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Court held that a trial court was not required to accept such allega-
tions as true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 66
Rather, as the Court put it, a trial court should engage in a "two-
pronged approach."6 7 A "court considering a motion to dismiss can
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth."68
As to these "conclusory" allegations, the trial court could "draw on its
judicial experience and common sense" to evaluate whether the allega-
tions "nudged" "across the line from conceivable to plausible."69 The
Court explicitly held that this was the pleading standard for "all civil
actions" pleaded under Rule 8.70
While Twombly may have left ambiguity about whether trial
judges could weigh the facts in deciding a motion to dismiss, the way
the Iqbal Court used the words "conclusory" and "plausible" removed
any doubt on the matter. In Iqbal, the petitioners, Messrs. Ashcroft
and Mueller, were alleged to have supervisory liability for confine-
ment policies based solely on a detainee's race, religion, or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest. The petitioners con-
ceded that they would be liable under Bivens if they had actual knowl-
edge of discrimination by their subordinates and exhibited deliberate
indifference to that discrimination.7 1 The complaint alleged that fol-
lowing the September 11 attacks, the FBI arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men; that many of these detainees were
designated by high-ranking FBI officials as being of "high interest";
that in many cases, including Iqbal's, this designation was made with-
out any supporting evidence and purely on the basis of race, religion,
or national origin, and for no legitimate penological interest; that Ash-
66. Id. at 1949-50.
67. Id. at 1950.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1950-51. One suspects that all of the form complaints in the Appendix Of
Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure inescapably would fall within this
category.
70. Id. at 1953. One of the interesting aspects of the Iqbal opinion is that following
its analysis and resolution of the issues, the opinion identifies and responds to
three arguments that could be raised against itself. Id. at 1953-54. The second
of these is that a better resolution of the case would have been to adopt careful
case management and thus limited discovery. Id. at 1953-54. In rejecting this
argument, the Court emphasized that it was an inadequate solution in a case
involving implausible allegations against high government officials. Id. This
language might suggest a narrow reading ofIqbal, limiting its import to lawsuits
brought against high government officials. Id. But for opponents of the Iqbal
opinion, this almost certainly is Pollyannaish thinking. Immediately preceding
the Court's discussion of lawsuits against high government officials is the Court's
retort to the argument that Twombly was only requiring plausible fact averments
in expensive antitrust litigation. It is in the course of rejecting this argument
that the Court holds that Twombly and Iqbal apply to "all civil actions." Id.
71. Id. at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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croft was the principal author of these policies; that Mueller was in-
strumental in the adoption, promulgation, and implementation of
these policies; that both Ashcroft and Mueller knew of, condoned, and
agreed to the conditions of confinement based solely on race, religion,
or national origin; and that, as to the policies regarding conditions of
confinement, Ashcroft wrote them and Mueller implemented them. 72
The Court, however, rejected the petitioners' concession on the stan-
dard for pleading supervisor liability in a Bivens action, holding in-
stead that "to state a claim . . . respondent must plead sufficient
factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and implemented the
detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but
for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or na-
tional origin."7 3 The Court then measured the factual allegations
against this newly enunciated formulation of the element and con-
cluded the complaint was simply "bare assertions" amounting to
"nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements"' of the
claim.74 In other words, the Court retreated (without acknowledging
such) from notice pleading back to fact pleading, and then set a
threshold for adequacy of facts that, in essence, held that if the plain-
tiffs did not come into the case with a smoking-gun level of evidence in
hand, then the allegations were sufficiently "conclusory" to allow a
trial court power to engage in a "plausibility" review.
The Court said "plausibility" was something more than "possibil-
ity" but something less than "probability."7 5 Where "plausibility" falls
on that spectrum is made more clear by Justice Souter's dissent. Jus-
tice Souter was the author of the Court's majority opinion in Twombly.
Justice Souter's Iqbal dissent chided the Iqbal majority as being too
aggressive in its standard for plausibility, arguing that the majority
was allowing a trial court to conclude a complaint was facially implau-
sible based on a standard that would not have been permitted by what
he meant when he used the word "plausible" in Twombly. The dissent
argues that all Twombly held was that a trial court did not have to
accept as true allegations "that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality
as we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiffs recent
trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel."76
But where did Twombly draw the line on plausibility? In
Twombly, Justice Souter's opinion found implausible the allegation
that local telephone companies might engage in price fixing as a
means of suppressing nascent potentially national competitors. Thus,
taking the Iqbal majority and dissent together, the standard for plau-
72. Id. at 1944, 1951, 1958-60, 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1948-49.
74. Id. at 1951.
75. Id. at 1949.
76. Id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting).
2009]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
sibility in Iqbal falls somewhere below "probability" but somewhere
above the likelihood, whatever that is, that local telephone companies
might agree to price fixing as a means of suppressing potentially com-
mon national competitors. And, perhaps more to the point, even in
the milieu of what is publicly known as of May 2009 concerning the
Bush Administration and its reaction to the September 11 attacks, the
Court still held under this standard that the allegations made by
Iqbal were facially implausible. 7 7
Given these holdings, it is inescapable that Iqbal invests trial
judges with the power to weigh evidence. Applying the Iqbal meaning
of "conclusory," in any case where discovery would be needed to garner
the evidence to succeed at trial, it would appear that a trial court
could confidently characterize the complaint as sufficiently "con-
clusory" to support a plausibility review. Applying the Iqbal meaning
of "plausible," it would appear that in any such case a trial judge then
could confidently characterize the case as implausible and dismiss it.
And it is virtually certain that this will result in the dismissal of cases
that otherwise, following discovery, would have emerged as meritori-
ous cases properly resulting in a plaintiffs verdict at trial.78
If the level of discourse prompted by Twombly was akin to the ac-
tivity of a live ferret, then the mind boggles at what will happen in the
wake of the Iqbal. But as an initial matter, it is nigh impossible to
characterize Iqbal as anything other than vesting a trial judge with
early power to weigh and decide the factual heft of a lawsuit, even at
the price of erroneously dismissing at least a handful of cases that,
given the fullness of discovery, would have developed factually suffi-
cient (indeed, meritorious) theories of recovery.
III. UNDER IQBAL, RULE 8 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
(SOMETIMES)
A. The Historical Test Leaves No Wiggle Room for Iqbal
The Seventh Amendment states, "In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be other-
wise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law."79 Twenty-one years after the adoption
of the Seventh Amendment, this language was interpreted by the leg-
77. See, e.g., Peter Spiegel & Jonathan Weisman, Conflicting Views on Terror Fight
Get Capitol Airing, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2009, at A2.
78. For precisely this reason, in the immediate wake of Iqbal, Senator Arlen Spector
introduced a bill in the United States Senate attempting to reverse the decision.
David Ingram, Specter Proposes Return to Prior Pleading Standard, THE NAT'L
L.J., July 24, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id=1202432493166.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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endary Justice Story. In United States v. Wonson,80 the defendant
was prosecuted for failing to pay penalties in accordance with the Em-
bargo Supplementary Act of 1808.81 The defendant won at the trial
court level and the Government appealed. Justice Story was asked to
decide "whether the facts are again to be submitted to a jury in this
court, or the appeal submits questions of law only for the considera-
tion of the court."8 2 In resolving this issue, Justice Story held that
within the text of the Seventh Amendment the phrase "common law"
referred to the law of England:
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the common law of
any individual state (for it probably differs in all), but it is the common law of
England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary
for me to expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must be obvious to
every person acquainted with the history of the law.
8 3
There has been sporadic criticism of the historical test.8 4 In de-
fense of the test, one scholar cogently argues that Justice Story's in-
tentions have been misunderstood.8 5  Yet the conventional
understanding of Wonson, interpreting the Seventh Amendment as a
static constitutional enshrinement of English common law jury rights,
is what we have and it has been the law for nearly two-hundred
years.8 6 In sum, "[n]o federal case decided after Wonson seems to
have challenged this sweeping proclamation; perhaps later judges
80. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
81. Id. at 750.
82. Id. at 745. Story recounts how at least some states did have the practice of sec-
ond juries on appeal. Id. at 748.
83. Id. at 750. If Justice Story had tried to explain the basis for his assertion that
"common law" referred to England, he would have found the task nearly impossi-
ble. There is no recorded legislative history suggesting that the phrase "common
law" referred to the common law of England. Nor is support found in the records
of the state debates, the Federalist Papers, or the writings of commentators of the
time. Indeed, Hamilton's concerns seem to suggest the opposite. THE FEDERALIST
No. 83, 523-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888). Justice
Story's assertion had no documentable basis. See David L. Shapiro & Daniel R.
Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill,
85 HARv. L. REV. 442, 448-49 (1971).
84. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AmA, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
88-93 (Yale Univ. Press 1998); Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 608-13 (1984);
Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to
a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1034-35 (1992); Stanton D. Krauss, The
Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U.
RICH. L. REV. 407, 479-83 (1999); Rachael E. Schwartz, "Everything Depends on
How You Draw the Lines:" An Alternative Interpretation of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 599, 616-22 (1996).
85. Krauss, supra note 84, at 460-75.
86. See AMAR, supra note 84, at 89; King, supra note 84, at 611-12; Klein, supra note
84, at 1006; Krauss, supra note 84, at 445-79; Schwartz, supra note 84, at
611-15.
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have hesitated to appear to be the kind of intractable person that
would require Mr. Justice Story to elaborate on the obvious."87
The Wonson interpretation of the Seventh Amendment became
known as the "historical test."8 8 Under the historical test, in order to
determine whether a civil case carries a jury right, one must ask if the
claimant would have a right to a jury trial according to eighteenth
century common law principles.8 9 If there was any doubt that this
was a test incorporating English practice as of a fixed point in time,
that was clarified in 1898 when the Supreme Court expressly recog-
nized that the Sixth and Seventh Amendments' phrase "trial by jury"
not only meant that a case should be compared to English practice,
but also that the comparison was fixed in time to English practice in
1791.90
B. The Supreme Court's Application of the Historical Test
to Pre-Trial Civil Procedure
Given the holdings of Twombly and Iqbal, it would be natural to
assume that, somewhere in the course of the opinions, at least lip ser-
vice was paid to the Seventh Amendment. Better still would be a
thoughtful discussion. After all, it is hard to conceive of the Supreme
Court considering increasing the fact weighing role of a judge without
being cognizant that this could result in a corresponding retraction of
the fact weighing role of the jury, which in turn might implicate con-
stitutional provisions concerning the role of the jury. That would be
wishful thinking.91
87. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 641 (1973).
88. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 87, at 639.
89. Klein, supra note 84, at 1023-30.
90. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898). See also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474, 476 (1935) (recognizing that interpretation of the Seventh Amendment re-
quires an evaluation of the common law at the time of adoption in 1791). While
there is some jurisprudence rejecting a static interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment, it arises in reference to its second clause; i.e., that at the pre-verdict
trial level the role of the jury cannot be narrowed from its role in 1791 England,
but that this stricture does not bind what a trial or appellate court can do under
the re-examination clause of the Seventh Amendment post-verdict. Thomas IV,
infra note 123, at 747-62; see also Joan E. Schaffner, The Seventh Amendment
Right to Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away, 31 U. BALT. L. REv. 225, 261-71 (2002) (identifying the Court's
different treatment of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial pre- and post-
verdict and arguing that the distinction devalues the right to a jury). Accord
Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving
Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO WASH. L. REV. 183 (2000).
91. I personally find this rather astonishing. I teach Civil Procedure. I happened to
be lecturing on the topic of pleading standards the day after the Court released
its opinion in Iqbal. I was less than half an hour into that class session when a
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None of the players in Twombly, judges or attorneys, seem to have
had any cognizance of a potential Seventh Amendment issue. In
Twombly, the words "Seventh Amendment" do not appear. The issue
does not come up in the majority opinion, 92 the dissent,9 3 the parties'
briefing,9 4 or the oral argument. 95
Nor did the Seventh Amendment come up in Iqbal. The Seventh
Amendment is not mentioned in the underlying Second Circuit opin-
ion,9 6 in the briefing to the Second Circuit,9 7 in the parties' briefing to
the Supreme Court,98 or in the oral argument before the Supreme
Court. 99 It was not mentioned in the majority opinion, or in either
dissent. Indeed, the Seventh Amendment is not even mentioned in
the amici curiae filed by "a group of law professors who teach and
write in the areas of Civil Procedure and Federal Practice."100
We should not be overly harsh toward the Justices or attorneys on
this issue. Over sixty years before Twombly, the Court seemed to
have held that the historical test did not address pleading rules. In
Galloway v. United States, the Court stated in dicta, "[tihe [Seventh]
Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural
incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791,
student asked how the Court could reach its holding without infringing on the
constitutionally protected right to trial by jury.
92. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547-70 (2007).
93. Id. at 572-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Brief for Petitioners, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 2474079;
Brief for Respondents, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 3089915;
Reply Brief for Petitioners, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL
3265610.
95. Transcript of Oral Argument, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL
3422211.
96. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
97. Brief for Defendants-Appellants Michael Rolince and Kenneth Maxwell, Iqbal,
490 F.3d 143 (No. 05-5768-CV (L)), 2006 WL 5234421; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee
Javaid Iqbal, Iqbal, 490 F.3d 143 (No. 05-5768-CV (L)), 2006 WL 5234423; Brief
of Appellants Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, Michael Cooksey, David Rardin, Iqbal,
490 F.3d 143 (No. 05-5768-CV (L)), 2006 WL 5516202; Reply Brief of Appellant
Dennis Hasty, Iqbal, 490 F.3d 143 (No. 05-5768-CV (L)), 2006 WL 5234426; Reply
Brief of Appellant Michael Cooksey, Iqbal, 490 F.3d 143 (No. 05-5768-CV (L)),
2006 WL 5234425.
98. Brief for Respondent Javaid Iqbal, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015),
2008 WL 4734962; Brief for the Petitioners, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4063957; Reply Brief for Petitioners, Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 5009266.
99. Transcript of Oral Argument, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008
WL 5168391.
100. Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Practice as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL
4792462.
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any more than it tied them to the common-law system of pleading or
the specific rules of evidence then prevailing."10 1
In light of this language from Galloway, one should proceed with
both caution and humility in reaching the conclusion that the Seventh
Amendment prohibits the federal courts from heightening pleading
standards. But, using the National Football League phrase "upon fur-
ther review," if either in Twombly or in Iqbal the Court sub silentio
had Galloway in mind, then upon further review this was a misguided
reliance on Galloway.
Joseph Galloway was a veteran of World War 1.102 While there is
ambiguity about his precise experiences in wartime France, it was ap-
parent that he came back a changed and troubled man. 10 3 One of the
military benefits Congress provided in those times was the War Risk
Insurance Act, which allowed soldiers to purchase insurance for total
disability resulting from "any impairment of mind or body."104 Gallo-
way had such insurance until he let it lapse as of May 31, 1919.105
Over the next roughly twenty years, Galloway had a difficult and
checkered life, including stints in both the Army and the Navy.' 0 6
Then, in 1938, Galloway sued the United States, claiming benefits for
total and permanent disability by reason of insanity that existed
before May 31, 1919.107 At the close of evidence at trial, the district
court granted the government's motion for a directed verdict, holding
the evidence legally insufficient to support a verdict for Galloway; the
appellate court affirmed.lo8 The Supreme Court accepted review to
address whether Galloway was deprived of trial by jury, contrary to
the Seventh Amendment.109
While the majority opinion in Galloway does address the constitu-
tionality under the Seventh Amendment of the procedure of directed
verdict, the case did not actually frame that issue. Galloway did not
challenge the power of a federal court to withhold or withdraw a case
from the jury on the basis of insufficient evidence, but rather asserted
that his evidence was sufficient (the Court disagreed).110 Further, ac-
cording to the Court, Galloway wrongly asserted that his action impli-
cated the Seventh Amendment; rather, his action did not carry a jury
101. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943).
102. Brief for the United States at 8-9, Galloway, 319 U.S. 372 (No. 533), 1943 WL
71847.
103. Id. at 8-12.
104. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 372 n.1.
105. Id. at 372.
106. Brief for the United States, supra note 102, at 12-25.
107. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 372-73.
108. Id. at 373.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 373, 388.
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right in 1791 England."' Nonetheless, the Court, through a majority
opinion and a spirited dissent, waded into an extended discussion of
whether the Seventh Amendment prohibited the procedure of directed
verdict.11 2
The Court began its analysis by reviewing one-hundred years of
precedent approving the power of federal courts to direct a verdict for
insufficiency of evidence." 3 None of the cases the Court cited ad-
dressed the Seventh Amendment.1U4 The Court next, without cita-
tion, noted that the rules of common law in 1791 did allow a trial court
to remove a case from the jury either through the procedures of de-
murrer to the evidence, which if granted ended the litigation, or mo-
tion for new trial, which if granted essentially created the opportunity
for a do-over. 1 15 But did the Seventh Amendment exclude any device
to take a case from the jury by any process "to which one or the other
of these consequences [did] not attach?""6 It was in answering this
question that the Court stated that the Seventh Amendment "did not
bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of
jury trial according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied
them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of
evidence then prevailing."" 7
None of the cases cited by the Court for this finding' S-which are
many of the same cases often discussed today in scholarship on the
scope of the Seventh Amendment-actually had any discussion at all
of whether the Seventh Amendment bound federal courts to the com-
mon law system of pleading prevailing in 1791. Ex Parte Peterson ap-
proved of the trial court retention of a financial auditor to report on
and simplify issues for a jury, finding the Seventh Amendment did not
categorically prohibit the introduction of new procedures, and indeed
the auditor served a role similar to the role of pleadings in the com-
mon law in that it focused and simplified matters for the jury.n 9 In
Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., the Court rejected a
claim for retrial on both liability and damages, and instead held that
an appellate court could set aside a verdict in part (in this instance,
affirming the verdict on liability but remanding for a new trial on
111. Id. at 388.
112. Id. at 388-407.
113. Id. at 389 n.19.
114. See S. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 284 U.S. 190 (1931); Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90
(1930); Comm'rs of Marion County v. Clark, 94 U.S. 278 (1876); Pleasants v.
Fant, 89 U.S. 116 (1874); Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442 (1871); Parks
v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362 (1850); Ewing v. Goode, 78 F. 442 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897).
115. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 390 n.22.
119. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1920).
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damages due to an erroneous jury instruction on damages) even
though this was not an available procedure at common law in 1791.
The Court held the Seventh Amendment was concerned with sub-
stance, not form, and the substance preserved was the right of the jury
to decide all issues of fact (and the jury had decided liability in the
first verdict).12o Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R.R. held
(without citation) that the procedure of the special verdict did not vio-
late the Seventh Amendment because the amendment
does not attempt to regulate matters of pleading or practice, or to determine
in what way issues shall be framed by which questions of fact are to be sub-
mitted to a jury. Its aim is not to preserve mere matters of form and proce-
dure, but substance of right. This requires that questions of fact in common-
law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume,
directly or indirectly, to take from the jury or to itself such prerogative. So
long as this substance of right is preserved, the procedure by which this result
shall be reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature, and the
courts may not set aside any legislative provision in this respect because the
form of action-the mere manner in which questions are submitted-is differ-
ent from that which obtained at the common law.
1 2 1
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof recognized the power of the legislature to
pass a statute empanelling an appellate jury to review a jury trial by a
justice of the peace, even though no such procedure existed at common
law in England. 122 Dimick v. Schiedt held that an appellate court con-
ditioning reversal on a defendant's declination of an additur did vio-
late the Seventh Amendment because of the absence of an English
judge having a similar right in 1791 England:
[H]ere we are dealing with a constitutional provision which has in effect
adopted the rules of the common law in respect of trial by jury as these rules
existed in 1791. To effectuate any change in these rules is not to deal with the
common law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution. 1 2 3
And as the Court itself described in Galloway, Funk v. United
States124 held that the Seventh Amendment did not impair the ability
to expand rules of admissibility of evidence. 12 5
In the end, the Galloway Court approved of directed verdict as a
mechanism for trial management when the evidence was insufficient
to reach a jury. But Galloway did not view "sufficiency" to be a weight
of the evidence issue; rather, the issue was about the existence of
proper evidence at all-the Court in Galloway emphasized that in the
120. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499 (1931).
121. Walker v. New Mexico, 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
122. Capital Traction v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 39 (1899).
123. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482-87 (1935). A useful, in depth, and ulti-
mately critical analysis of the Court's opinion in Dimick is Suja A. Thomas, Re-
Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2003) [hereinafter Thomas IV].
124. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
125. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 n.22 (1943).
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end "the essential requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed
to do duty for probative facts."12 6
As this dissection of Galloway reflects, the Court never intended to
hold or to even suggest that the Seventh Amendment would permit
the federal courts to change pleading standards (or any other rules) in
a way that decreased the fact evaluation role of the jury.127 In Gallo-
way, the precise issue was the sufficiency of the evidence of each ele-
ment of plaintiffs case to get to the jury. The Court affirmed the
ruling of the trial and appellate courts that, as a matter of law, the
evidence was insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff. A sec-
ondary issue in Galloway was whether the procedure of directed ver-
dict implicated the Seventh Amendment. The Court held that it did
not because the action was not one to which the Seventh Amendment
right attached. The tertiary issue was the broader jurisprudential
question of whether the Seventh Amendment reserved for the jury the
determination of the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Court found
that directed verdict was allowed under the Seventh Amendment be-
cause it did not narrow the role of the jury as it existed in 1791, citing
cases holding the Seventh Amendment constitutionally enshrined "the
rules of common law in respect of trial by jury as these rules existed in
1791," as well as cases holding that the Seventh Amendment "does not
attempt to regulate matters of pleading and practice" so long as the
"prerogative" of the jury is not lessened.128 The Court implicitly found
126. Id. at 395.
127. Indeed, in his dissent in Galloway, one of Justice Black's criticisms of the major-
ity opinion is that nonetheless "[t]oday the Court comes dangerously close to
weighing the credibility of a witness and rejecting his testimony because the ma-
jority do not believe it." Id. at 405 (Black, J., dissenting). Plainly Justice Black
made this comment based on the assumption that not even the majority would
contend this was proper. Yet, it is this same prerogative that the majority both in
Twombly and in Iqbal, without introspection, seems to assume that judges do
have.
128. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 487-88. There is conflict between the holdings of these cases
regarding whether the Seventh Amendment preserves only the substance of 1791
common law jury rights, or rather preserves the precise procedural forms of those
rights as well. While in Galloway the Court did not explicitly acknowledge this
conflict, the Court did adopt the view that "the Amendment was designed to pre-
serve the basic institution ofjury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not
the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then so widely
among common-law jurisdictions." Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392. The Court
reached this conclusion by noting the "widely divergent common-law rules on pro-
cedural matters among the states, and between them and England" in 1791, and
thus concluded that the Seventh Amendment could not have been intended to
adopt any single set of rules. Id. at 391-92. In this regard, the Court was coming
to the exact opposite analytical conclusion that Justice Story came to in United
States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750), looking at the
same divergence of 1791 common law jury practice. There is no discussion of
Wonson in Galloway. The Court apparently was unaware of this implicit rejec-
tion of Wonson. The Court employed similar reasoning in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
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that under either construction the common law in 1791 permitted
courts to find that if, accepting all of a party's evidence as true, there
was a failure of proof on an element, then there was insufficient
proper evidence for the jury to weigh.12 9 But here is the critical
point-nothing in Galloway, or in any case cited in Galloway, or in
any other pre-Twombly decision, held or even suggested a court could
take a case away from the jury because while the evidence, accepted
as true, would be sufficient, the court simply found it implausible.13o
While there is no post-Galloway Supreme Court jurisprudence on
pleading standards and the Seventh Amendment, this reading of Gal-
loway is consistent with the post-Galloway Supreme Court Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence on the broader topic of procedural reform.
Thus, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore-a case holding that offensive
collateral estoppel did not violate the Seventh Amendment-the Court
cited Galloway among three examples of "procedural devices devel-
oped since 1791 that have diminished the civil jury's historic domain"
and yet "found not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amend-
ment."13 1 Similarly, in Colgrove v. Battin, the Court cited Galloway
as authority for holding that six-member juries did not present Sev-
enth Amendment issues. 13 2 Finally, in Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc., the Court found the historical evidence equivocal, and so
for reasons of "the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries,"
held that patent claim construction was the province of the judge.13 3
In summary, this single phrase within a single sentence of the
opinion in Galloway-that the Seventh Amendment does not bind con-
temporary courts to eighteenth Century pleadings standards-is the
entirety of the Court's twentieth century jurisprudence on the issue to
date, and it is insufficient to insulate Iqbal from constitutional scru-
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986), holding that summary judgment did not implicate
the Seventh Amendment
129. The Court in Galloway back-stopped this analysis by emphasizing that a directed
verdict did not infringe on a litigant's right to trial by jury. Galloway, 319 U.S. at
392-93. The Court gave no acknowledgement to, or discussion of, the intention of
the Seventh Amendment to preserve the rights and power of the jury.
130. Indeed, one of the central points of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore is essentially this point-that whether the Seventh
Amendment preserved just the substance, or also the form, of 1791 common law
jury practice (the dissent reviews many of the Court's prior opinions on both sides
of this proposition), no case approved of substantive encroachment of jury rights
by masking the encroachment as a mere procedural change. Parklane Hoisery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 344-50 (1979).
131. Id. at 336. See also Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S.
494, 497-97 (1931) (finding retrial of damages only, without the use of a jury,
acceptable under the Seventh Amendment); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United
States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902) (holding that summary judgment does not
violate the Seventh Amendment).
132. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973).
133. Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376-84, 388-91 (1996).
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tiny under the Seventh Amendment. And, to repeat the point, be-
cause an eighteenth century English common law judge could not
subject a writ to a plausibility review and on that basis dismiss a case,
the weighing of evidence was the responsibility of a common law jury.
C. The Academic Debate over the Constitutionality of Pre-
Trial Civil Procedure
The inattention of the courts to the Seventh Amendment implica-
tions for procedural reform largely has been mirrored by the level of
attention, or inattention, to the same issues by scholars. There is not
much academic work addressing the Seventh Amendment implica-
tions for contemporary civil procedure. The majority of the work has
been by Professor Suja Thomas. The focus of her writing has been a
vigorous, provocative, and often lonely argument that, because of the
Seventh Amendment, summary judgment is unconstitutional. 134 Her
core argument is that under the historical test there is no 1791 En-
glish common law analog to summary judgment because there was no
device in 1791 English common law through which a judge could make
a pre-trial ruling that, based on the undisputed evidence, the case
failed as a matter of law.135 Thus, accepting the historical test as the
law of the land (which she does), Professor Thomas concludes that
summary judgment is unconstitutional.136
There is not universal acceptance of Professor Thomas' argument.
Some concede the lack of a 1791 English common law analog, but chal-
lenge the correctness of blindly hewing to the historical test, believing
it to be a misreading of the text of the Seventh Amendment.13 7 Others
concede the applicability of the historical test, but dispute the lack of a
1791 English common law analog, asserting that both trial by inspec-
tion and demurrer to the evidence were appropriate 1791 English
common law procedures for entry of judgment before trial if there was
no dispute as to the facts.138
Professor Thomas has replied to both positions. To the former, she
says that the argument fails as a matter of the textual interpretation
of the Constitution.139 To the latter, she says that trial by inspection
was more analogous to judicial notice, because a common law judge
would never evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of inferences,
134. Thomas II, supra note 21; Thomas III, supra note 25; Suja A. Thomas, The Un-
constitutionality of Summary Judgment: A Status Report, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1613
(2008).
135. Thomas II, supra note 21.
136. Id.
137. Nelson, supra note 7, at 1653.
138. Brunet, supra note 24.
139. Thomas III, supra note 25, at 1678-84.
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while a modern judge does precisely this in determining whether to
grant summary judgment.140
D. The Constitutionality of the Motion To Dismiss-A
Thought Experiment
While Professor Thomas' focus has been summary judgment under
Rule 56, in the immediate aftermath of Twombly she asserted that,
like summary judgment, motions to dismiss, at least if attacking the
factual specificity of a pleading, had no counterpart to eighteenth cen-
tury English common law.141 She concluded that, as a result of
Twombly, Rule 12 now was, in all civil cases, unconstitutional. 142
The comparison of summary judgment to pleadings standards and
motions to dismiss is an imperfect one. Rule 56 requires that "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact."1 4 3 If courts hew honestly to
this language there is no constitutional problem, as the common law
did have an analog to summary judgment.14 4 There is no analogous
textual trap door in Rule 8 or Rule 12 to escape the historical test.
There is, however, a more critical point of divergence between the
Seventh Amendment analysis of Rule 56 on the one hand, and Rules 8
and 12 on the other hand. Conceptually, summary judgment is
grounded in taking cases away from the jury. Per force, summary
judgment arises only in cases that otherwise would have a jury trial.
There is no reason to bring a Rule 56 motion in a bench trail. That is
not the case with the motion to dismiss. Thus, while the Seventh
Amendment applies with equal vigor (or not) to all cases involving
Rule 56, that is not so as to cases involving Rules 8 and 12.145
To illustrate this problem, try this two-step thought experiment:
First, divide civil filings into five categories. Category A are those
cases for which it has been determined that there is a right to jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment. There are three types of these
cases: those with claims that the Court has held were cognizable
under 1791 English common law, those with claims that the Court has
recognized to have an analog under 1791 English common law, and
those that are statutory rights with a statutory entitlement to jury, as
the Court has held that Seventh Amendment rights extend to statuto-
140. Id. at 1667.
141. Thomas I, supra note 16, at 1871-72.
142. Id. at 1873-84.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
144. Brunet, supra note 24.
145. Professor Thomas is inescapably plain in her view, however, that the historical
test would require this standard to apply to all civil cases. Thomas I, supra note
16, at 1883-84.
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rily created rights "if the statute creates legal rights and remedies,
enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."146
Category B are the cases that the Court has held do not have a jury
right under the Seventh Amendment. Typically this would be a newly
recognized right either developed in the courts or created by statute,
for which the Court has concluded there is no 1791 English common
law analog, statutory rights with non-Article III adjudicatory fo-
rums,14 7 statutorily created "public rights" claims,148 and (for the pur-
poses of this thought experiment) claims where there might be a jury
right, but for which the Court nonetheless has expressly approved a
heightened pleading standard.149
Category C are the cases where it has not yet been decided by the
Court whether the Seventh Amendment would attach, but where
whatever the answer is, it will be the same across all claims in the
action. This is its own category because whether any particular case
within this category would ultimately be found to have a jury right is
surprisingly and disturbingly unpredictable; rather, as one treatise
summarizes how the courts have solved the problem of how to apply
the historical test in the wake of the merger of law and equity:
The problem is unsolvable. The courts for the most part "solved" it piecemeal
through rules of thumb purporting to be deduced from the historical test. The
commentators have struggled to formulate more generalized resolutions, with
only limited success.150
146. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). See also Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (holding that a Labor Man-
agement Relations Act action for breach of a union's duty of fair representation
carried a right to trial by jury); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (hold-
ing that the actions asserted under the Clean Water Act carry a right to trial by
jury).
147. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (no jury right
for labor disputes within the jurisdiction of the NLRB).
148. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (only certain rights
created under the Bankruptcy Act are private rights and thus implicate the Sev-
enth Amendment). For a more detailed discussion of the import and problems
with the public rights exception, see Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public
Rights Doctrine in Light of the Historical Rationale of the Seventh Amendment, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013 (1994).
149. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2512 (2007)
(holding the heightened pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act did not entail a Seventh Amendment issue because "Congress, as cre-
ator of federal statutory claims, has power to prescribe what must be pleaded to
state the claim.").
150. FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 508 (5th ed., Foundation Press 2001) (citations omitted). See also Martin H.
Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 486, 530-31 (1975) (discussing the
unpredictability of the application of the historical test to contemporary civil
litigation).
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Category D are the hybrid cases. In other words, this category has
the cases where some claims have a jury right and others do not (so-
called cases with both legal and equitable claims).151
Category E are the ambiguous mixed cases. These are actions
where there is clarity as to the jury right (or lack thereof) as to some
claims, and a lack clarity as to others.
Second, assume a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (brought on the basis of
Iqbal implausibility) across these categories. There would be quite
the muddle: The Seventh Amendment would make the motion uncon-
stitutional in Category A cases. There would be no constitutional im-
pediment to the motion attack in Category B cases. In Category C
cases, the trial court would have to hold a pre-discovery hearing to
determine whether there were jury rights, which in turn would drive
whether constitutionally the trial court could consider the motion (this
would certainly generate significant appellate litigation in some por-
tion of these actions, and thus would seem to obviate the Court's
stated goal in Twombly of controlling the cost of litigation).
What about Category D? The Court has held that for actions
presenting some claims with a jury right and others without a jury
right, the claims with a jury right should be tried first.152 In Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, the Court, recognizing that the disposition
of an equitable claim first could have the effect of disposing of legal
claims and thus involuntarily eliminating a jury right, held:
If there should be cases where the availability of declaratory judgment or join-
der in one suit of legal and equitable causes would not in all respects protect
the plaintiff seeking equitable relief from irreparable harm while affording a
jury trial in the legal cause, the trial court will necessarily have to use its
discretion in deciding whether the legal or equitable cause should be tried
first. Since the right to jury trial is a constitutional one, however, while no
similar requirement protects trials by the court, that discretion is very nar-
rowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury
trial.... [O]nly under the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to
a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable
claims.153
In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, the Court held that a legal claim which
was only "incidental" to an equitable claim, and which indeed could
not even exist independent of the equitable claim, not only still carried
a jury right, but under Beacon Theatres still had to be tried first.154
Yet, because the Seventh Amendment would be a constitutional im-
pediment to a motion to dismiss challenging the plausibility of legal
claims, if interpreted under the historical test, but not of equitable
claims, a motion to dismiss in a Category D case involving mixed
151. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
152. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 470-73; Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510-511.
153. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510-511 (citations and footnotes omitted).
154. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 470-73.
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claims in equity and in law would reverse the order of disposition
mandated in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen.
Of course, the problem gets yet messier in the Category E case-
actions where there is clarity as to the jury right (or lack thereof) as to
some claims, and a lack clarity as to others. There, at minimum, cases
would encounter the Category C-like additional layer of pre-trial eval-
uation, and perhaps a lengthy appeal to determine the scope of ambig-
uously applicable Seventh Amendment rights, only to lead in many
cases to a Category D-like Beacon Theatres/Dairy Queen sequencing
issue.
What this thought experiment exposes is the messy answer to the
question: "If the historical test is correct, then are motions to dismiss
unconstitutional?" One cannot give a blanket "Yes" or "No" answer.
Rather, the answer is: "Sometimes yes, sometimes no, sometimes in
part both yes and no, and sometimes we do not know."
But what is inescapable is that Iqbal defines an interpretation of
Rule 8 that in many, many cases cannot be squared with the Seventh
Amendment as interpreted under the historical test (and that it will
be a difficult, and likely undesirable, to engage in the process of sort-
ing out which cases are which). There can be no debate whatsoever
that an eighteenth century English common law judge could not do
what the Supreme Court in Iqbal now empowers twenty- first century
federal district judges to do.155 There can be no debate that this is not
a mere incident of technical procedure-this is a weighing of evidence,
pre-discovery, with the potential consequence of dismissal of poten-
tially meritorious litigation. Twombly took Rule 8 on a path that
could not be squared with the Seventh Amendment, as interpreted
under the historical test. And to paraphrase a Jewish prayer from a
wildly different context, in Twombly it was written, in Iqbal it was
sealed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Aldous Huxley wrote, "[I]acts do not cease to exist because they are
ignored."1 5 6 The constitutional protection of right to trial by jury in a
civil case is, in the contemporary environment of a perceived explosion
of frivolous litigation, an inconvenient legal doctrine. That is not a
justification, however, for ignoring it. In a future article, I will argue
for an alternative and preferred interpretation of the Seventh Amend-
ment. But under the way the Amendment has been understood for
roughly 200 years, under Iqbal, Rule 8 is unconstitutional
(sometimes).
155. Brunet, supra note 24, at 1631-40.
156. ALDOUS HUXLEY, PROPER STUDIES 205 (Chatto & Windus 1949), available at http:/
/quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=genpub;cc=genpub;rgn=full%20
text;idno=AJE0708.0020.OO1;view=image;seq=00000229.
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